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Hovis: Wills and Trusts

WILLS AND TRUSTS
I.

EXECUTION OF A WILL

In In re O'Neill' contestants attacked the validity of the decedent's will and requested that it be proved in solemn form. On
appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court the central issue
raised was whether evidence had been presented demonstrating
that the testator had known the contents of his will. The court
stated the rule: "If no further showing is made than that the will
was executed by a capable testator, the proponent has succeeded
2
in establishing the essential fact of knowledge of contents."
II.

CONTRACT TO WILL

In Corontzes v. Trapolis3 the South Carolina Supreme Court
was asked to determine the existence of a contract to make a will.
Plaintiff, decedent's niece, contended that decedent had orally
agreed to will her all his estate in return for her services in caring
for him in his later years. Testimony was offered to prove the
existence of this contract, but the weight of the plaintiff's evidence centered on a will made by the decedent. This will gave the
majority of decedent's property to plaintiff, but because of improper attestation the will was not valid. The plaintiff argued that
this will, although invalid, should be regarded as corroborative of
the oral contract under which plaintiff claimed. The Chief Justice
of the supreme court agreed with the plaintiff and pointed out in
a dissenting opinion joined in by Justice Lewis that many jurisdictions accept the doctrine of "conforming wills."' He stated:
"When there is evidence tending to show the existence of a contract to make a will, proof of the terms of a will in conformity with
such contract is confirmatory proof that the agreement was
made." 5 The Chief Justice concluded the plaintiff's evidence supported by the conforming will was sufficient to establish a valid
contract.
The majority of the court, however, recognized that the law
in South Carolina was not as the dissent contended. Citing the
1.
2.
3.
4.

259 S.C. 55, 190 S.E.2d 754 (1972).
Id. at 63, 190 S.E.2d at 758. The court quoted from 57 AM. JuR. Wills § 862 (1948).
259 S.C. 244, 191 S.E.2d 523 (1972).
Id. at 255, 191 S.E.2d at 529.

5. Id.
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leading case of Young v. Levy,' the court stated: "Apparently
overlooked by counsel and the court was the rule prevailing in this
State that an attempted will which makes no reference to a
contract to devise is not competent evidence of the existence of
such a contract." 7 Furthermore, the court noted that the will was
executed twenty years after the alleged contract and that an attempt to connect the two would be farfetched. Finally, the court
observed that the will did not leave the entire estate to plaintiff
and thus did not actually conform to the alleged contract. Thus,
the court held that the plaintiff failed to establish that the decedent contracted to will her his entire estate.
f1.

ADMINISTRATOR'S FEES

In Minter v. State Departmentof Mental Health' respondent
sought to collect certain fees in connection with his administration of a decedent's estate. Appellants, creditors of the estate,
objected to respondent's accounting. The decedent had been a
patient for some thirty-seven years in the South Carolina State
Hospital. During the last years before her death, decedent became entitled to certain payments from the Veterans Administration which were paid over to the state hospital.' Upon her death
the state hospital paid her funeral expenses out of the fund from
the Veterans Administration and paid the balance to respondent
as administrator of decedent's estate. Respondent sought to have
his commissions as administrator include a commission on the
amount paid by the state hospital for funeral expenses. The
South Carolina Supreme Court noted that the South Carolina
Code provides that the administrator is entitled to a commission
on the sums "which he shall receive" and "which he shall pay
away."' " Pointing out that respondent neither received nor paid
away the funeral expense funds, the court denied the respondent
the right to recover commissions on the funeral expenses.
Secondly, respondent contended that the attorney's fees he
incurred in bringing this action should be paid by the decedent's
estate because he was acting in his capacity as administrator.
6. 206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E.2d 889 (1945).
7. 259 S.C. at 247, 191 S.E.2d at 524.
8. 258 S.C. 186, 187 S.E.2d 890 (1972).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1042 (Cum. Supp. 1971) allows the State Commissioner of
Mental Health to act on the patient's behalf in such circumstances.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-534 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
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The court disagreed, stating: "It is apparent to us that this litigation by the respondent against the appellants was solely for his
own benefit. In such a case, the estate should not be called upon
to bear the expense of attorney's fees for the bringing of this
action.""
IV.

TRUSTS

In Citizens & Southern NationalBank v. Auman12 the South
Carolina Supreme Court dealt with the problem of construing a
trust instrument. Decedent had entered into a trust agreement
with plaintiff (trustee) which, among other things, created life
estates in her son and daughter-in-law with a gift over to certain
of her nieces and nephews. The relevant terms of the trust provided that, after the deaths of the decedent and the holders of the
life estates, "this trust shall terminate and the trust estate shall
be paid over in equal shares to such of the nieces and nephews of
the grantor as are listed in Schedule B attached hereto." 3 In
addition, the decedent agreed to execute all instruments necessary to vest the trustee with full title to the property.
A "Schedule B" was never added to the trust agreement and
the plaintiff brought this action for a declaratory judgment to
determine the rights of the various beneficiaries.
Decedent's son contended that the decedent retained a reversionary interest in the trust following the life estates and that this
interest was subject to defeasance only by the designation of certain nieces and nephews, such designation not having been made.
The son further contended that since his mother retained a reversionary interest in the property it should descend to him by way
of intestate succession. The nieces and nephews took the position
that they had a remainder interest and that the trust passed as a
resulting trust to them following the termination of the life estates. They also contended that the failure of the decedent to
designate certain nieces and nephews constituted a class gift to
all nieces and nephews.
The court recognized that when someone creates a power of
appointment in a person by which that person is to designate
certain members of a class, a failure to make such designations
11. 258 S.C. at 197, 187 S.E.2d at 895.
12. 259 S.C. 263, 191 S.E.2d 511 (1972).
13. Id. at 266, 191 S.E.2d at 512.
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will cause the estate to pass to all members of the class. 4 However, the court pointed out that in this case the decedent had
given a power of appointment to no one but had retained such
right in herself. Thus, no class gift had been created.
Secondly, the court noted that because decedent had retained the power of appointment in herself she had retained the
fee and had not given it to the trustee. This was true, said the
court, even though the trust instrument had purported to vest the
trustee with full title. Citing Thomason v. Hellams'" the court
noted, "We have recognized that a life estate with the power
of disposal may be validly created." 6 Thus, reasoned the court,
the decedent did retain a reversionary interest in the estate which
passed at the time of her death to her son. The court distinguished Blount v. Walker,'7 relied upon by the nieces and nephews for their argument that a resulting trust had been created,
by emphasizing that in that case the fee was given to the trustee
and no reversion in the donor existed.
W. RYAN Hovis
14. The court cited Withers v. Yeaton, 1 Rich. Eq. 324 (S.C. 1845), and RETATEMENT
§ 27 (1959).
15. 233 S.C. 11, 103 S.E.2d 324 (1958).
16. 259 S.C. at 270, 191 S.E.2d at 514.
17. 31 S.C. 13, 9 S.E. 804 (1889).

(SECOND) OF TRUSTS
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